AAP General News (Australia)
08-24-2011
FED:Afghanistan - no-one thought we'd still be there
By Max Blenkin, AAP Defence Correspondent
CANBERRA, AAP - Boarding a C-130 transport aircraft preparing to depart Afghanistan,
then Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) commander Lieutenant Colonel Gus Gilmore surveyed
the dusty fields of the sprawling US base at Bagram and mused to himself: "I won't be
back here again."
That was mid-December 2002 and 150 Australian special forces troops had just concluded
the final rotation of an eventful 12-month deployment, assisting US forces to rout al-Qaeda
and Taliban remnants in southern Afghanistan.
Pretty much everyone else also thought that was the last time Australian troops would
fight in Afghanistan.
But as it turned out, they were back within three years, fighting an invigorated Taliban
insurgency. They're still there.
Special forces were the first Australian troops into Afghanistan in late 2001. And
it's likely they'll be the last out, if, as foreshadowed, a modest force remains in an
overwatch role after the bulk of the troops head home in 2014.
For the SASR, Afghanistan came just weeks after the controversial boarding of the Norwegian
freighter Tampa to stop a group of asylum seekers reaching Christmas Island.
It also came two years after East Timor and a year after the major security operation
for the Sydney Olympic Games.
Like many around the world, now Major General Gilmore, Australian Defence Force special
operations commander, watched with growing amazement as events unfolded in New York on
the evening of September 11, Australian time.
"It was one of those rare occasions when I was actually at home back in Swanbourne.
I was watching the TV. It was in the evening and then the tickertape came along the bottom
about a plane crashing into a building," he said.
"It wasn't long after that the second plane came in and it dawned this wasn't just
a plane off track - it was actually a significant planned attack."
Soon after, a call came from special operations headquarters. In another call, it was
advised that defence chief Admiral Chris Barrie was cancelling his visit scheduled for
the next day and heading back to Canberra.
"From there it didn't take long until we were warned out," he said.
The attacks may have occurred in New York and Washington but even before the dust and
smoke dissipated, the US gaze settled on Afghanistan, its unlovable fundamentalist Taliban
regime and their houseguests, the Islamist terror group al-Qaeda.
In 1996, al-Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden had been expelled from Sudan, relocating
to southern Afghanistan and establishing training camps under the protection of kindred
Taliban spirits.
Al-Qaeda didn't admit responsibility for 9/11 until much later but they had form, including
the 1993 attack on the same World Trade Centre, plus attacks on US embassies in Africa
in 1998. The biggest investigation in US history quickly produced a clear picture of how
the attacks were mounted and by who.
Three days later, Prime Minister John Howard, in Washington on 9/11, invoked the ANZUS
treaty. On September 20, he foreshadowed deployment of Australian troops and on October
4 officially announced Australia's contribution to the war on terror - two RAAF tanker
aircraft, warships and 150 SASR troops.
However, the SASR knew well before of their likely involvement and had embarked on
intensive preparation.
One squadron launched a program of specific training for a possible Afghanistan deployment,
concentrating on extended vehicle-mounted operations in mountain and desert terrain in
which communications and firefights would likely be conducted at long range.
One immediate challenge was the Afghan winter. Although the unit had mountain warfare
experts on its roster, almost all previous operations had been conducted in tropical climes.
"We didn't have a lot of really good cold or wet weather gear in our Q-stores. Defence
coughed up and we went out and brought things from Mountain Designs," Gilmore said.
"Fortunately we were pretty well equipped in terms of weapons and all that type of stuff."
As it turned out, events on the ground proceeded faster than many anticipated.
The US launched air attacks in support of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, itself
supported by US special forces, on October 7. Kabul fell on November 12 and the final
Taliban bastion, the city of Kandahar, on December 7. But many Taliban and al-Qaeda remained.
The Australian task force arrived by air at Forward operating Base (FOB) Rhino, on
the border of Kandahar and Helmand provinces, on December 3, launching initial operations
soon after.
Rhino, the first major Afghanistan foothold for US troops, was a dirt airstrip next
to a drug facility in the Registan Desert, smack in the middle of the Taliban's southern
Afghanistan heartland.
For the SASR, the plan was to conduct patrols to find and report on al-Qaeda and Taliban
activities, particularly in an area to the west of Kandahar, not necessarily looking for
a fight but well able to do so.
"It also became very evident that the guys were very good at what they did," Gilmore said.
"We could send relatively small elements in their longrange patrol vehicles over significant
distances. They could persist in an area for a long time, which meant resupply wasn't
a huge issue.
"They could report information. They could interdict Taliban lines of communications
and if necessary conduct direct action against training camps and facilities."
Subsequently the Australian base relocated to Kandahar on December 21 and then to Bagram,
a sprawling Soviet-era air base north of Kabul, on February 20, 2002.
Throughout this period, the Australian patrols roamed far and wide, gathering information
to build the intelligence picture of Taliban and al-Qaeda facilities and training camps.
One such facility examined by Australian troops was the residence of Taliban leader Mullah
Omar in Lashkar Gah.
The Americans were impressed.
"There really weren't too many in the world who could operate in that type of environment
for that period of time and provide the quality of information and robustness in terms
of combat capability," Gilmore said.
Two events stand out.
On February 16, 2002, a patrol vehicle travelling in Nimruz Province, in Afghanistan's
far south-west near the border with Iran, struck an anti-tank mine, likely left over from
the Soviet conflict more than a decade earlier.
Grievously hurt in the blast, Sergeant Andrew Russell became Australia's Afghanistan
first fatality. There have since been 27 more deaths, 14 of them special forces.
Around this time, intelligence revealed a significant al-Qaeda presence, mostly foreign
Uzbek fighters, wintering in the Shah-e-kot Valley of Paktia Province, adjacent to the
Pakistan border and Operation Anaconda was launched.
This turned into a very big fight indeed, involving US, Afghan and coalition troops
and all the Australian task force, whose role was to watch over one end of the valley,
block any escape or reinforcement and fight if need be.
One patrol played a central role in Anaconda's signature action, what was called the
Battle of Takur Ghar. This was an al-Qaeda occupied mountaintop where an American Chinook
helicopter sought to land US troops, sparking a savage battle.
The Australian troops on an adjacent feature directed air attacks on enemy forces and
actually engaged the enemy fighters.
In an interview soon after the battle, Australian task force commander Lieutenant Colonel
Rowan Tink said that resulted in the death of a very large number of enemy fighters.
"The figure confidently put in battle damage assessments is around about 300, that
is killed by our people either directly or indirectly as they in guided close air support,"
he said.
Sergeant Matthew Bouillaut was awarded the Dinstinguished Service Cross for his outstanding
leadership of the patrol involved n this action.
Gilmore said this was a fierce fight and Australian troops performed extraordinarily
well in a wide range of tasks.
"Anaconda was the most significant engagement. There had been a number of direct action
missions, engagements, skirmishes but at that time for us that was the biggest engagement,"
he said.
Australian troops came home in mid-December 2002.
Gilmore said it was assessed that the initial mission of completely dismantling al-Qaeda
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had been achieved, although there was a clear awareness
that other issues, including governance and development, needed more time.
"From a special forces perspective, I don't think there was a sense that we hadn't
done what we had initially been sent in to do," he said.
As it turned out, the Taliban came back, with the insurgency escalating from 2005.
There's certainly a view that the US and allies erred in moving on to Iraq, allowing
the Taliban time to regroup. At one point Australia had just one soldier in Afghanistan,
engaged in coordinating mine clearance.
AAP mb/it
KEYWORD: SEPT11 AFGHAN AUST (AAP BACKGROUNDER)
� 2011 AAP Information Services Pty Limited (AAP) or its Licensors.
